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A MISSED OPPORTUNITY: THE FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS
DIANA HASSEL*
Introduction
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),' that venerable workhorse for imposition
of tort liability against the United States, had the potential to become a significant
tool for the effective redress of civil rights claims. This potential saw life for a brief
period of time, but was quickly extinguished. Instead, the Supreme Court curtailed
the scope of the FTCA, choosing rather to emphasize the benefits of judicially
created civil rights actions against individual federal employees, such as that created
in Bivens v. Six Unnamed Agents.2 The interpretation of the FTCA that led to its
elimination as a potential mechanism for the redress of civil rights claims was not
inevitable. The text of the FTCA and the legislative history accompanying its
amendments allow for a broad interpretation of the scope of claims that are
cognizable under the FTCA. This article explores the reasons why the potential of
the FTCA in the area of civil rights has never been realized and analyzes some of
the consequences of this missed opportunity.
As a primary cause for the curtailment of the use of the FTCA, this article points
to the Supreme Court's shortsighted view that a judicially created claim based
directly on the federal Constitution against individual federal employees was a
superior remedy. In order to emphasize the need for actions based directly on the
federal Constitution, the Court denigrated existing statutory remedies, such as the
FTCA. In the rush to embrace the judicially created civil rights claim, the benefits
of an action against the United States under the FTCA were overlooked. Civil rights
litigants were left with a mechanism that focuses on the individual liability of a
federal employee rather than governmental liability under the FTCA. The rejection
of the FTCA in order to further the expansion of claims against individual federal
employees was particularly unproductive, given the limited effectiveness of those
actions.
* Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law. B.A., 1979, Mount Holyoke
College; J.D., 1985, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey - Newark. Assistant United States
Attorney, Southern District of New York, 1988-93. The author would like to thank her former colleagues
at the Civil Division of the United States Attorney's Office in the Southern District of New York for their
interest and support in this project, and in particular AUSA Kay K. Gardiner for her insight and
encouragement. The author would also like to thank Jose L. Fernandez, Andrew Horwitz, Jonathan B.
Mintz and Michael J. Yelnosky for their helpful comments on drafts of this article. Brandan S. Bell
provided research assistance.
1. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-424, 60 Stat. 812, 842-47 (1946) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1996
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
In narrowly interpreting the language of the FTCA, the Supreme Court missed
an opportunity to provide an effective remedy against the United States for violation
of civil, rights. The benefits of governmental liability for such claims has been
widely discussed in the literature, but most scholars have emphasized the necessity
of amending the FTCA to achieve this end.3 While such amendment might now be
the only realistic route to altering the scope of the FTCA, the federal courts had
within their grasp a way to make use of the FTCA in the effective and fair
resolution of civil rights claims. Failing to take this opportunity needlessly limited
the range of remedies available to deter civil rights violations and to provide
compensation for those whose rights are trampled upon.
L Civil Rights Claims Against the Federal Government
A. The Provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act
Since it took effect in 1948, the FTCA has provided a remedy against the United
States for harm caused by the negligence of its employees. The Act provides that:
[T]he district courts... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions
on claims against the United States, for money damages ... for injury
or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstan-
ces where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.4
This general waiver of sovereign immunity is hedged by many exceptions to the
government's liability and conditions which must be satisfied before a suit can be
brought. For example, acts based on a "discretionary function" of a federal
employee are not the basis for a claim.' Similarly, claims based on the delivery of
the mail,6 the assessment of taxes,7 or arising out of combat,' are excluded. Sig-
3. See, e.g., PETER H SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZENS REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS
196-97 (1983); Thomas J. Madden et al., Bedtime for Bivens: Substituting the United States as
Defendant in Constitutional Tort Suits, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469,472 (1983); H. Allen Black, Balance,
Band-Aid or Tourniquet: The Illusion of Qualified Immunity for Federal Officials, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 733, 773-79 (1991).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
5. The FTCA shields the United States from liability for certain policy-driven decisions:
The provisions of Isis chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to -
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute
or regulation be vzlid, based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
Id. § 2680(a).
6. "The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to .... (b) Any




nificantly, prior to 1974, claims based on certain intentional torts - assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, and interference with contract rights - were also
excluded as a basis for an action against the United States
The United States is also protected from unshielded exposure for the acts of its
employees by procedural safeguards and limitations on the scope of remedies that
are available. The United States cannot be liable for punitive damages."0 Prior to
bringing a suit in district court, a claimant must present his claim to the federal
agency whose employee is alleged to have caused the injury." The United States
provided a significant protection for itself by denying a claimant under the FICA
the right to a jury trial. 2
Apart from the exceptions and protections that are particular to the United States,
the basis of liability under the FrCA has traditionally been state tort concepts. 3
Since the United States is liable as an individual would be "in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred,"'" courts have generally
looked to state law to provide the substance of "the law of the place." Prior to
the 1974 Amendments, the FTCA was viewed merely as a vehicle to bring common
law tort claims against the United States, not as a potential mechanism for bringing
tort claims based on the federal Constitution against the United States. 6 Accor-
§ 2680(b).
7. Another significant limitation to FTCA liability shields the United States from claims based on
collection of taxes:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to -
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs
duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise
or any other law-enforcement officer.
Id. § 2680(c).
8. "The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to .... () Any
claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during
time of war." Id. § 2680(j).
9. The 1994 Amendments modified the exclusion for "acts or omissions of investigative or law
enforcement officers of the United States Government." Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, §
2, 88 Stat. 50, 50 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994)); see infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
11. See id. § 2675 (a), (b). A claimant must wait until the agency has denied his claim to bring his
action in federal court. The claimant will be limited in his federal court action to the amount he sought
in his administrative claim. See id.
12. See id. § 2402.
13. See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 503, 506 (E.D. Okla. 1965).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(D) (1994).
15. Adams, 239 F. Supp. at 506.
16. Even before the 1974 Amendments, the FTCA could have been interpreted to allow for recovery
for constitutional torts. The United States was to be held liable as an individual would be according to
the law of the place where the act occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970). This broad liability could
be interpreted to include constitutional violations based on state or federal law. However, the exclusion
of intentional torts from the ambit of the FICA would make this a strained interpretation of the Act,
since the exclusion seems to expressly relieve the government from liability for the types of behavior
1996]
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dingly, in order to seek civil damages against the federal government for violations
of civil rights, plaintiffs were forced to look beyond the FTCA to judicially created
remedies.
B. Creation of a Civil Rights Claim Against the Federal Government
Unlike state and local officials, who can be liable in money damages for their
acts that violate the federal Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,"7 there was no
analogous basis for bringing a damages suit against a federal official for violation
of a citizen's civil rights.'8 Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court was
confronted, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents,9 with the question of whether there
was any federal cause of action for damages available against an individual federal
employee who had violated the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights.0 The Court
answered in the affirmative, determining that a claim for damages based on a
violation of the Fourth Amendment against a federal law enforcement official was
appropriate even in the absence of congressional action authorizing such a claim.2'
The Court created a damages remedy against individual federal law enforcement
officials for violation of the Fourth Amendment.' In doing so, the Court raised
several issues that would become the focal point of the continuing debate
concerning the parameters of the remedy.
In Bivens, the plaintiffs claim was based on his search and arrest by agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The agents entered the plaintiffs apartment,
manacled him, searched the apartment, arrested him, and at the courthouse,
interrogated and searched him.' The plaintiff claimed that the arrest was made
without probable cause, that unreasonable force was used, and that as a result of the
agents' behavior he experienced humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering.24
The plaintiffs complaint was dismissed in the court below for failing to state a
cause of action.
that are most commonly characterized as constitutional violations such as unlawful searches and
detentions.
17. Section 1983 w/as derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13.
18. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of
any State or Tenitory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
19. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
20. See id. at 389.
21. See id. at 395-96.
22. See id. at 397.
23. See id at 389.
24. See id at 389-90.




Justice Brennan, writing the opinion of the Court, rejected the defendants'
argument that the plaintiff had no remedy based on federal law for the alleged
violation of Fourth Amendment rights.' The defendants contended that the plaintiff
should seek redress based on state tort law, and if the government officials were not
acting in a valid exercise of federal power, they would be subject to liability under
state law tort principles Justice Brennan concluded that there was a federal basis
for the plaintiffs claim regardless of state law: "the Fourth Amendment operates as
a limitation upon the exercise of federal power regardless of whether the State in
whose jurisdiction that power is exercised would prohibit or penalize the identical
act if engaged in by a private citizen."'
The limitation imposed by the Fourth Amendment could properly be expressed
in a claim for monetary damages against the individual federal officer.2 Justice
Brennan acknowledged that:
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for its
enforcement by an award of money damages for the consequences of
its violation. But "it is ... well settled that where legal rights have
been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue
for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make
good the wrong done."
The Court determined that it was free to act even in the absence of congressional
mandate because the case presented "no special factors counselling hesitation in the
absence of affirmative action by Congress"'" and because "[the Court] ha[d] no
explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's violation
of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents, but
must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of
Congress. 3"
In his concurring opinion Justice Harlan expressed the belief that the protection
of constitutional interests was a particular responsibility of the federal courts. 3 He
26. See id. at 390-92.
27. See id. at 390-91.
28. Id at 392.
29. See id at 395-96.
30. Id at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1945)) (omission in original).
31. Id.
32. Id at 397.
33. See id. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Harlan much more explicitly set
forth the basis of the Court's power to create a remedy based on the Fourth Amendment. Referring to
the federal courts' power to award damages to effectuate federal statutory schemes, Justice Harlan
rejected the contention that federal courts cannot award damages for violations of constitutional rights
without prior action by Congress. Instead, he concluded that:
it would be at least anomalous to conclude that the federal judiciary - while competent
to choose among the range of traditional judicial remedies to implement statutory and
common-law policies, and even to generate substantive rules governing primary behavior
in furtherance of broadly formulated policies articulated by statute or Constitution - is
powerless to accord a damages remedy to vindicate social policies, which by virtue of
1996:1
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further explained that compensatory damages are appropriate given the nature of the
injury suffered when Fourth Amendment privacy interests are violated, even if the
award of damages has little deterrent effect on future constitutional wrongdoing.'
Justice Harlan also remarked that a claim of damages against an individual federal
employee would in most cases be a plaintiffs only source of redress: "However
desirable a direct remedy against the Government might be as a substitute for
individual official liability, the sovereign still remains immune to suit."35
Justice Black in his dissent expressed doubt about the wisdom of creating such
a remedy even if the Court had the power to do so.' His concerns focused on the
fact that the courts are "choked with lawsuits" and that adding a new cause of action
would only add to that problem. 7 In addition, Justice Black was concerned that
the damages remedy "might deter officials from the proper and honest performance
of their duties."3
The Court identified its reluctance to allow a remedy for a constitutional right
to rest on state law and emphasized the desirability of having a uniform federal law
their inclusion in the Constitution, are aimed predominantly at restraining the Government
as an instrument of popular will.
Id. at 403-04 (Harlan, J.. concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted). Justice Harlan further pointed
to the equitable remedial powers of the federal courts as an analogous broad source of authority to
fashion relief whose validity does not depend on prior congressional action, stating that:
if a general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts by Congress is thought adequate to
empower a federal court to grant equitable relief for all areas of subject-matter jurisdiction
enumerated therein, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), then it seems to me that the same statute is
sufficient to empower a federal court to grant a traditional remedy at law.
Id. at 405 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
34. See i.d at 408 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
35. I. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). Chief Justice Burger dissented from the
Court's opinion writing that the creation of a damage remedy should properly be the work of Congress
and not the Court. See id. at 411 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). He further opined that Congress should enact
a damages remedy for Fourth Amendment violations as a substitute for the exclusionary rule. See id. at
421 (Burger, C.J., disserting). Justice Burger viewed the suppression of evidence gathered in violation
of the Fourth Amendment in a criminal trial as a remedy for unconstitutional behavior that exacts too
high a societal cost. See id. at 416-20 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Important evidence is suppressed in
criminal trials allowing the guilty to go free. See id. at 416 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Burger's
dissenting opinion is devoted almost entirely to his explanation of the "fundamental weakness" of the
exclusionary rule and the benefits that would flow from congressional elimination of the rule and the
creation of a substitute damages remedy. See id. at 411-27 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
36. See id. at 427-30 (Black, J., dissenting).
37. See id. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting). In Justice Black's dissent, he concluded that creating a
damages remedy for violations of constitutional violations was beyond the power of the federal courts.
Pointing to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 as an example of the exercise of congressional will when it wanted to
create a remedy against individuals for violations of civil rights, Justice Black expressed the belief that
absent such action by Congress, the Court could not act. See id. at 427-28 (Black, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion also expressed concern at the potential "avalanche of new
federal cases" and the possibility that the remedy "will tend to stultify proper law enforcement and to
make the day's labor for the honest and conscientious officer even more onerous and more critical." Id.
at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun concluded that if additional remedies are needed "it
is the Congress and not this Court that should act." I. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).




apply to civil rights claims against federal officials.39 The dissenting opinions
expressed reservations about the deterrence value of the remedy and also forecasted
a negative effect on federal law enforcement.' In several of the opinions, the
justices directly, or at least implicitly, expressed their desire that Congress address
the issue and determine explicitly whether and what kind of remedy should be
available to individuals whose civil rights are violated by federal officials.41
C. 1974 Amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act
In the wake of the Bivens decision and in response to the perceived lack of
remedy against the United States for particularly outrageous wrongful acts by law
enforcement agents,42 Congress amended the FTCA in 1974.!' These amendments
provided the basis for the FTCA to be used as a remedy for civil rights violations.
The most significant change brought by the 1974 Amendments was an exception to
the exclusion of the intentional torts listed in the FTCA." The amended act
included within its scope claims against the United States arising out of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution
based on the "acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the
United States." '4
The main impetus for these amendments was the desire to establish a remedy for
citizens who had been the victims of unconstitutional raids by federal law
enforcement agents. In support of the amendment, Sen. Charles H. Percy (R.-Ill.)
related the tale of a raid by federal agents at the home of the Giglottos in
Collinsville, Illinois.47 Federal agents broke into the Giglottos' home without
warning. The house was ransacked, and the family was threatened with drawn
weapons. During this raid the agents did not identify themselves. At some point
during their search the agents discovered they had raided the wrong house and left
the home without any apology or explanation. Senator Percy related several
similar stories outlining the kind of unconstitutional behavior in which federal drug
enforcement agents were engaging around the country.49
39. See id. at 408-09 (Harlan, J., concurring).
40. See id. at 421-22 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 397 (majority opinion); id. at 421 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 429 (Black, J.,
dissenting); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
42. See S. REP. No. 93-588 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789.
43. See Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50.
44. Those torts are: assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, and interference with contract rights. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h) (1994).
45. Id.
46. See S. REP. No. 93-588, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 2789.
47. See SENATE Gov'r OPERATIONS COMM., ESTABLISHING A DRUG ENFORCEMENT AD-
MINISTRATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, S. REP. No. 93-469 (1973). The individual views of
Senator Percy were included as part of the Committee Report. See id
48. See id. at 30.
49. See id at 30-32.
1996]
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In Senator Percy's words, the FTCA was amended to permit victims such as the
Giglottos "to bring actions directly against the Federal government to recover for
the damage they sustained due to the intentional or willful misdeeds of Federal
officers. This, it seems to me, is only right and fair under the circumstances."'
Members of Congress were shocked that citizens were without an effective remedy
against the United States for unlawful searches and raids such as that conducted
against the Giglottos. Since the Giglottos were not prosecuted for any criminal
violation and no evidence was seized, "the traditional remedy [for suppression of
evidence gathered unconstitutionally] open to those who have had their Fourth
Amendment right; violated by the police is meaningless."'"
Congress was aware that while remedies are available against individual state
agents under the Civil Rights Act of 1871' and against federal agents under
Bivens, 3 "causes of action against officials as individuals will, on occasion, be
virtually worthless since government employees may be so lacking in funds as to
be judgment proof. '" A remedy against the government was considered necessary
because otherwise "[c]itizens seeking compensatory damages . . are left with the
often rather hollcw right of bringing a civil action against the agents directly
responsible for their losses."55
On November 30, 1973, the amendment was passed in the Senate. Portions of the
Senate Report we:.-e read into the record, explaining that "the [amendment] would
submit the Goverrment to liability whenever its agents act under color of law so as
to injure the public through search and seizures that are conducted without warrants
or with warrants issued without probable cause."56 However, the Report maintained
that the actions covered by the amendment were not limited to constitutional torts.57
The legislative record supports the conclusion that the liability established by the
1974 Amendments should be seen as a "counterpart to the Bivens case and its
progeny in that it waives the defense of sovereign immunity so as to make the
Government independently liable in damages for the same type of conduct that is
alleged to have occurred in Bivens."'5
Similarly, when the amendment was discussed in the House of Representatives,
the purpose of the Bill was understood to provide a civil remedy against the United
50. l at 33. Along with amending the FTCA, Congress at the same time repealed the no-knock
statute which allowed forcible entry by federal agents in certain circumstances. See id, at 33-35.
51. id. at 35.
52. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
53. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
54. S. REP. No. 93-469, at 36 (1973). Concluding that the state of law that provided "no remedy
against the Federal goremment if one of its agents intentionally violates an individual's constitutional
rights" should be conected, Senator Percy stated that the "Federal Treasury should be ultimately
responsible" for compensating victims when federal agents intentionally violate constitutional rights. Id.
55. Il
56. 119 Cong. Rec. S38,559, S38,969 (1973).
57. See id "However, the Committee's amendment should not be viewed as limited to constitutional
tort situations but would apply to any case in which a Federal law enforcement agent committed the tort





States for "fourth amendment violations where a police officer may improperly enter
the premises of a suspect."59 However, the House was cognizant of the problems
raised by the amendment in providing a remedy for federal constitutional violations
through a remedial scheme that is tied to state law.' Nevertheless, the House
passed the amendment on March 5, 1974, and it became effective on March 16,
1974.61
On the most simple level, Congress had altered the FTCA to allow for claims
against the United States based on some intentional torts of federal law enforcement
officers. These intentional torts - assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
abuse of process, and maliciou5 prosecution - roughly parallel the types of harms
also caused by violations of the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures. However, the legislative history of the amendments suggests
that Congress meant to do more than broaden the scope of state tort remedies
available under the FTCA. Congress intended to provide a remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations, and perhaps other constitutional claims generally, through
the FrCA.
The implementation of the desire to expand the FTCA to include the Fourth
Amendment as a basis for relief was complicated by the language of the FTCA,
which provided that the United States was liable under the FTCA "in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."'62 Prior to the
amendments, that provision had been interpreted to mean state tort law. By not
clarifying whether the amendments were meant to include constitutional law within
the "law of the place," Congress left in the hands of the courts a somewhat
ambiguous expression of its will on the issue of constitutional claims under the
FTCA.
IL Judicial Interpretation of the FTCA
A. Interpretation of 1974 Amendments
Following the 1974 amendments to the FTCA, several courts took Congress at
its word and began to apply the FTCA to constitutional claims against the United
States. Courts approached the expansion of the FTCA in different ways. Some
interpreted the 1974 Amendments as a direct waiver of sovereign immunity for
59. 120 Cong. Rec. H5285, H5287 (1974). In discussing the amendment, the House was particularly
concerned about the possible impact that a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations would have on the
exclusionary rule. The House also questioned whether the FTCA should be the exclusive remedy and
thus eliminate duplicative remedies against individual agents. See id. at H5288.
60. See id. at H5288.
61. See Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50, 50 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h) (1994)).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
63. See, e.g., Van Schaick v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 1023 (D.S.C. 1983); Norton v. Turner, 427
F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'd sub nora. Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1978);
Avery v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 937 (D. Conn. 1977); Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967
(E.D.N.Y. 1977), affd in part, rev'd in part, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978).
1996]
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constitutional claims against the United States.' Others, influenced by the
legislative history of the 1974 amendments to the FTCA, were inspired to take a
new look at the language of the Act. These courts determined that even before the
1974 Amendments, the FT7CA could be used to bring constitutional claims against
the United States.S A new look was also given to the use of state law as a basis
of constitutional claims. The FTCA could be used to vindicate federal constitutional
interests if those interests were also protected by state law.' In all of these
approaches, the courts were seeking, at least to some degree, to expand the reach
of the FTCA to include within its ambit civil rights claims against the United States.
The courts were attempting to reconcile the apparent goal of Congress in expanding
the FTCA to cover constitutional claims and the language of the FTCA, which
bound the remedy to the "law of the place."
1. 1974 Amendments As Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
The most direct: response to the newly amended FTCA was the conclusion
reached by some courts that the 1974 Amendments were a waiver of sovereign
immunity that was coextensive with the liability of an individual under Bivens.
Thus, just as an individual federal employee would be liable for violations of the
Fourth Amendment under Bivens, so would the United States be directly liable for
the same violation. Accordingly, those courts concluded that claims based directly
on the Constitution could be made under the FTCA. For example, in Norton v.
Turner,7 the plaintiff was awarded summary judgment for a claim against the
United States for Fourth Amendment violations arising out of the entry and search
of her apartment.'
The Government's defense in Norton centered on the assertion that it was entitled
to the defenses that individual employees would have under Bivens, such as
qualified immunity. The court rejected this argument, finding that under the FTCA
the United States could not assert defenses available to individual defendants." In
reaching this conclusion, the court looked to the legislative history of the 1974
Amendments and determined that Congress intended the FTCA to reach "the same
kind of conduct that is alleged to have occurred in Bivens" but to withhold from the
United States defenses such as good faith that would be available to an individual
in a Bivens case.'D The court concluded that the 1974 Amendments were meant to
expand the recovery available to aggrieved citizens under Bivens' Congress had
64. See Norton, 427 F. Supp. at 152; cf. Van Schaik, 586 F. Supp. at 1029 (recognizing that
Congress may waive sovereign immunity).
65. See Birnbaum, 436 F. Supp. at 976; Avery, 434 F. Supp. at 945 n.1 1.
66. See Birribaum, 436 F. Supp. at 976; Van Schaik, 586 F. Supp. at 1031-32; Myers & Myers, Inc.
v. United States Postal Serv., 527 F.2d 1252, 1260 (2d Cir. 1975).
67. 427 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Va. 1977).
68. See id. at 152. The plaintiff also brought actions against individuals under Bivens and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See id.
69. See id. at 146.
70. See id. at 147-48.




concluded that Bivens was inadequate in part because of the ease with which an
individual federal employee could establish a good faith defense.'
Interestingly, the Government did not raise the defense that the FTCA did not
include Fourth Amendment violations within its scope, but instead was limited to
state law as a basis for liability.3 Since the court concluded that the Government's
actions had violated the Fourth Amendment and that the United States was not
entitled to assert immunity defenses available to federal employees, judgment was
entered for the plaintiff. 4
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision on the issue
of whether the United States could assert the good faith of the officials as a
defense."5 Again, the United States did not contest the applicability of the FTCA
to a claim based on the Fourth Amendment. The court concurred in the district
court's view that the Fourth Amendment claim could be brought under the FTCA,
stating that the 1974 Amendments are "clearly intended to waive the federal
government's sovereign-immunity defense in suits brought to redress violations of
the fourth amendment committed by federal law enforcement officers."76 The court
acknowledged the ambiguity of the statutory language, stating that "[tihe statutory
language... suggests that its applicability is limited to suits alleging certain state-
created intentional torts .... [T]he legislative history, however, makes clear that the
1974 amendment was viewed by Congress as 'a counterpart to the Bivens case."'
Based on its belief that Congress meant to create a counterpart to Bivens, the court
concluded that the United States would be entitled to the same good faith defenses
available to an individual defendant in a Bivens suit.
78
Similarly, ii Van Schaick v. United States,' the plaintiff brought an "FTCA
action, claiming that his arrest and confinement by the Drug Enforcement Agency
violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. The court expressed doubt
whether constitutional claims could be brought under the FTCA, but was bound to
follow Norton's dictate that such claims were cognizable under the 1974
Amendments. However, the court decided that even if such a claim could be
brought, it could not succeed because of the good faith of the federal officials
involved.'
72. See id. at 148 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-469, at 36 (1973) (individual views of Senator Percy)).
73. See id. at 146 n.7.
74. See id. at 152.
75. See Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390, 391 (4th Cir. 1978).
76. Id. at 392-93.
77. Id. at 395.
78. See id. at 397.
79. 586 F. Supp. 1023 (D.S.C. 1983).
80. See id. at 1031. Norton ruled that the good faith defenses available to individual agents under
Bivens were also available to the United States under the FTCA. See Norton, 581 F.2d at 393-94; see
also Cynthia R. Finn, Recent Decision, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 651 (1979).
The district court in Norton also concluded that a constitutional claim could be brought if South
Carolina recognized a private cause of action for constitutional deprivations. See Norton, 586 F. Supp.
at 1031.
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Taking a straightforward view of what the 1974 amendments to the FTCA
accomplished, the decisions in Norton and Van Schaick were based on an
interpretation of the amendment as a waiver of sovereign immunity for civil rights
claims. Their support for this conclusion lies not in the language of the amended
statute but in the legislative history which expressed Congress's intention to provide
a broad remedy to aggrieved citizens.
2. 1974 Amendments As Expression of Policy
A few decisions, staking out the most radical perspective on the scope of the
FTCA, determined that even before the 1974 Amendments, civil rights claims could
be brought against the United States under the FTCA. In Birnbaum v. United
States," Judge Jack J3. Weinstein found that a constitutional claim could be brought
against the United States under the FTCA.' The claim was based on the intercep-
tion and opening of the plaintiffs mail by the CIA. The court ruled that the opening
of the plaintiffs mail violated the First and Fourth Amendments.' Turning to 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h), the court reviewed the 1974 Amendments and concluded that
Congress meant to broaden the scope of the FTCA to cover Fourth Amendment
violations.' The court stated that "Congress altered section 2680(h) so that, from
the date of amendment forward... Fourth Amendment violations would be
actionable against the government, providing aggrieved persons actual relief, rather
than worthless awards against 'judgment-proof individual agents.""
The Birnbaum decision, however, turned on the pre-1974 provisions of the FTCA.
The Birnbaum court determined that even without the 1974 Amendments, consti-
tutional claims could be brought against the United States under the FTCA.' This
approach relied upon the reasoning that constitutional torts were not explicitly
excluded under the FTCA and therefore fell within the general waiver of liability. 7
Birnbaum also relied on finding a basis for federal constitutional claims within state
law. Thus, if the state law provided a remedy for a federal constitutional claim, then
it was covered by the FTCA." Accordingly, Judge Weinstein concluded that the
FTCA provided for a claim against the United States based directly on the
Constitution, and also for a claim based on New York tort law, which provided a
remedy for violation of federal constitutional rights."
The Second Circuit Court of 'Appeals affirmed Judge Weinstein's judgment,
finding that a claim for surreptitiously opening mail could be brought against the
81. 436 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aTd in part, rev'd in part, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978).
82. See id. at 972-76,
83. See id. at 972. The court also determined that the CIA's actions did not fall within the
discretionary function or postal matter exceptions to the FTCA. See id. at 973-74.
84. See id. at 975.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 975-76,
87. See id.





United States under the FTCA.' However, the FTCA claim could be based only
on New York state law, which provided a common law tort remedy for intrusions
upon privacy." The Court of Appeals rejected the district court's conclusion that
the FTCA could be used for redress based directly on the federal Constitution.'
The court stated that because claims under the FTCA must be based on "the law of
the place," the claims must be founded on state law principles, not federal law."
Applying reasoning similar to that of the district court in Birnbaum, the court in
Avery v. United States' concluded that a claim for a constitutional tort against the
United States could lie under the FTCA.95 In Birnbaum, the court did not rely on
the 1974 Amendments and nonetheless concluded that a constitutional claim could
be brought against the United States.' In Avery, the plaintiff claimed that his
constitutional rights were violated by the Central Intelligence Agency when his mail
was opened. The claim was brought under the FTCA, and the Government moved
to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court denied the
motion. 7 The plaintiffs claim was based on the "constitutional tort of invasion of
privacy," and the court concluded that this tort was not one of the enumerated
intentional torts that is excluded under section 2680(h); therefore, a claim against
the United States was proper." While not directly addressing the issue, the court
apparently determined that federal constitutional law, not merely state tort law,
could function as the source of substantive relief under the FTCA.'
3. State Law Basis for Constitutional Claim
In addition to their reliance on the expansion of the FTCA expressed in the 1974
Amendments, the courts in Birnbaum and Van Schaick also concluded that the
FTCA could be used as a basis for federal constitutional claims if those claims were
the basis for a remedy under state law. For example, the district court in Birnbaum
found that "[v]iolation of plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights is ... a ... ground
of liability under New York law. New York treats tortious conduct, in violation of
the Constitution, by government agents as grounds for recovery of damages.""'
Because money damages were available under New York law for violations of the
90. See Bimbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 328-33 (2d Cir. 1978).
91. See id. at 326.
92. See id. at 327.
93. See id.
94. 434 F. Supp. 937 (D. Conn. 1977).
95. See id. at 939.
96. Birnbaum, 436 F. Supp. at 975-76.
97. See Avery, 434 F. Supp. at 939.
98. See id. at 945-46.
99. The court in Avery did not explicitly define the federal Constitution as the source of the
"constitutional tort of invasion of privacy" that was the basis of the claim. However, the court expressed
the belief that the interests protected by the action are those based on "principles of constitutional
liberty," thus apparently concluding that the claim is based on more than state tort concepts. See id. at
946.
100. Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 983 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), affid in part, rev'd in part,
588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978).
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federal constitution,"°' such a claim was similarly cognizable against the United
States under the F'CA.
In Van Schaick v. United States," the court similarly concluded that claims
based on federal constitutional rights could be brought against the United States
under the FTCA if state law "recognize[s] a private cause of action for damages for
constitutional deprivations."" In both Birnbaum and Van Schaick the FTCA was
viewed as a mechanism to vindicate federal constitutional interests if those
constitutional interests were also the basis for a damages claim under state law.
This approach allows federal constitutional principles to function as a basis for
claims under the FTrCA but does not run afoul of the "law of the place" mandate
since the source of the remedy is still state law.
Taking a seemingly similar but fundamentally different approach, the court in
Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Service" determined that a claim
based on the failure to comply with constitutional standards of due process could
be brought against the United States under the FTCA.'0  The plaintiff in Myers
was denied a renewal of its trucking contract and barred from future contracts with
the Postal Service without a hearing."° The court reasoned that the plaintiffs due
process-like claim could be the basis of a state tort claim." The court suggested
that under some state tort law, the failure to comply with constitutional requirements
could constitute interference with business opportunity or negligence."4 Thus, the
court endorsed the use of the FTCA to vindicate federal constitutional interests,
when those interests could be translated into state tort law concepts.
The approach of the Myers court reflects a much more narrow use of the FTCA.
Federal constitutional interests could be protected by the FTCA if those same
interests are also protected by state tort law concepts. Unlike Birnbaum and Van
Schaick, the source of the law in Myers must be the state tort concepts rather than
the federal right itself. The conception of the scope of the FTCA expressed in
Myers is the traditional one: a claim may be brought against the United States based
on state tort law. The fact that a claim based on state tort concepts might also
vindicate interests similar to those expressed in the federal Constitution is irrelevant.
101. See id. at 985. Judge Weinstein relied on a series of New York cases awarding damages for
violations of constitutional rights by law enforcement officials. See People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585 (N.Y.
1926); Casler v. State, 307 N.Y.S,2d 695 (App. Div. 1970); Brenon v. State, 297 N.Y.S.2d 88 (App. Div.
1969); Frady v. State, 242 N.Y.S.2d 95 (App. Div. 1963); Nader v. General Motors Corp, 292 N.Y.S.2d
514 (Sup. Ct. 1968) aft'd, 298 N.Y.S.2d 137 (App. Div. 1969), and affid, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (N.Y. 1970);
Herman v. State, 357 N.Y.S.2d 811 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Baisch v. State, 351 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
102. 586 F. Supp. 1023 (D.S.C. 1983).
103. Id. at 1031.
104. 527 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1975).
105. See id. at 1256.
106. See id. at 1258-59.





B. Impact of Carlson v. Green
Judicial interpretations of the FTCA as a remedy for constitutional torts were
brought up short by the Supreme Court's decision in Carlson v. Green." In
Carlson, the Court was faced with the question of whether a Bivens claim against
an individual federal employee was available to redress a constitutional claim even
when there was another remedy, in this case the FTCA, for the wrong. Justice
Brennan, writing the opinion of the Court, concluded that "[pilainly FFCA is not
a sufficient protector of citizens' constitutional rights.""' Since the FTCA did not
provide an adequate remedy for the wrongs alleged by the plaintiff, the Court,
following Bivens, expanded the scope of constitutional claims that could be brought
against individual federal employees. The Court concluded that the plaintiff had
stated a claim against the individual federal employees based on the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments."'
In the opinion of the Court, Justice Brennan reasoned that in Bivens the Court had
determined that a claim against federal employees based directly on the Constitution
was available absent "special factors counselling hesitation""' or a congressional
declaration that "persons injured by federal officers' violations of the Eighth
Amendment may not recover money damages... but [instead] must be remitted to
another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress.""' Thus, the Court
interpreted Bivens to require the creation of a cause of action based directly on the
Constitution, unless Congress explicitly provided a remedy that insured the same
procedural protections and damages as Bivens. Here, the Court determined that there
were no "special factors counselling hesitation," nor had Congress provided an
equally effective remedy for the plaintiffs injury."" The alternative remedy
available to the plaintiff in Carlson, found to be inadequate and therefore not a
substitute for a Bivens action, was a claim under the FTCA. In reaching the
conclusion that the FTCA was an inadequate remedy for the claims of the plaintiff
in Carlson, the Court delineated the ways in which the FTCA was a less effective
remedy than a Bivens claim.
One of the Court's objections to the FTCA as an effective remedy focused on the
assumption that constitutional claims under the FTCA would not be treated
uniformly because of the FTCA requirement that the United States be liable "in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. ""5 The
Court concluded that "[t]he question whether respondent's action for violations by
federal officials of federal constitutional rights should be left to the vagaries of the
laws of the several States admits of only a negative answer in the absence of a
109. 446 U.S. 14, 25 (1980).
110. Id. at 23. The claim in Carlson was brought on behalf of an inmate who allegedly received
inadequate medical care at a federal correctional facility. See id. at 16 n.j.
11. See id. at 20.
112. Id. at 18 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396).
113. Id. at 19.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 23 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
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contrary congressional resolution.""6 Thus, one limitation the Court identified with
the FTCA was based on the Act's "law of the place" language. The Court
interpreted "law of the place" to mean state law, not federal law." Since "the law
of the place" was determined to be state law, the law applied under the FTCA to
determine whether a cause of action existed would not be uniform."'
Another basis articulated by the Court for the ineffectiveness of the FTCA was
that the Act provided less deterrence to wrongdoing by federal employees than did
a Bivens claim. Personal financial liability of an individual employee, rather than
money damages against the government based on the FTCA, was perceived to be
a stronger deterrent."9 Similarly, the Court stated that another superiority of a
Bivens claim was that punitive damages may be awarded under Bivens, while they
were statutorily prohibited under the FTCA.' Another indication of the inferiority
of the FTCA remedy was that it did not permit a jury trial, while such a trial was
available under a Bivens claim.' The Court concluded that given the limitations
it had delineated in the FTCA, the Act was not a remedy that was equally effective
as Bivens; therefore, a claim against the individual federal employees should go
forward."
In his dissenting opinion in Carlson, Chief Justice Burger argued that the Court
had gone too far in requiring that Congress explicitly create an alternative remedy
before a Bivens claim was barred." Instead, Justice Burger concluded: "The
Federal Tort Claims Act provides an adequate remedy for prisoners' claims of
medical mistreatment. For me, that is the end of the matter."'" Similarly, Justice
Rehnquist in a separate dissent also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the
FTCA was an inadequate remedy for the plaintiffs claims and that, therefore, a
Bivens action was required." Justice Rehnquist stated that the majority's
conclusion "is all the more anomalous in that Congress in 1974 amended the FTCA
to permit private damages recoveries for intentional torts committed by federal law
enforcement officers, thereby enabling persons injured by such officers' violations





119. See id at 21.
120. See id at 21-22.
121. See id at 22-23.
122. See id. at 18-23.
123. See id at 30 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
124. Id. (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist had even more fundamental problems with the
majority's decision than did Justice Burger. Justice Rehnquist believed that "absent a clear indication
from Congress, federal courts lack the authority to grant damages relief for constitutional violations."
Id. at 41 (Rehnquist, J., dssenting). His dispute with the majority accordingly was not limited to his
assessment of the availability of an alternative remedy such as the FrCA, but with the authority of the
courts acting alone to create a Bivens-type remedy. See i. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
125. See id at 32-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).




Justice Rehnquist went on to question the majority's conclusion that the FTCA
provided a less effective remedy than did a Bivens claim because it allowed
damages against an individual federal employee rather than against the United
States.'z This assessment, Justice Rehnquist asserted, failed to take into account
other factors that enter into the effectiveness of a remedy, such as "the amount of
damages necessary to offset the benefits of the objectionable conduct, the risk that
the wrongdoer might escape liability, the clarity with which the objectionable
conduct is defined, and the perceptions of the individual who is a potential
wrongdoer."'" In addition, Justice Rehnquist noted that the morale and effec-
tiveness of government employees may suffer due to the possibility of a suit against




Justice Rehnquist doubted the necessity of uniform rules to govern liability for
violations of federal rights.' He asserted that federal courts frequently refer to
state law and defer to state procedure in implementing a federal remedial scheme:
Once we get past the level of a high-school civics text, it is simply not
self-evident to merely assert that here we have a federal cause of action
for violations of federal rights by federal officials, and thus the question
of whether reference to state procedure is appropriate "admits of only
a negative answer in the absence of a contrary congressional resolution."
The Court articulates no solid basis for concluding that there is any
interest in uniformity that should generally be viewed as significant.'
Thus, Justice Rehnquist questioned whether uniformity - a major flaw in the
FTCA according to the majority of the Court - was really a significant issue.
In reaching the conclusion that the FTCA could not be an effective remedy for
injuries such as those suffered by the plaintiff in Carlson, the Court narrowly
interpreted the scope of the FTCA. Most significantly, the Court concluded that the
"law of the place" language of the FTCA limited the substantive law covered by the
FTCA to state tort law.3 2 In addition, the Court pointed to the individual liability
provided by Bivens, but not by the FTCA, as a superior deterrent.'33 The Court
also viewed the failure of the FTCA to provide for a jury trial or punitive damages
127. See id. at 44-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also questioned the majority's
reliance on the fact that punitive damages were available under Bivens and not the FrCA, because the
question of the availability of punitive damages under both Bivens and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remained
unsettled. See id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also questioned the majority's assertion
that the availability of a jury under Bivens was more desirable than the bench trial provided for under
the FTCA. See id. at 48 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
130. See id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
132. See id. at 23.
133. See id. at 25.
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as an indication of its inadequacy as a mechanism for redress of constitutional
claims."
After Carlson's narrow interpretation of the provisions of the FTCA, broader
interpretations, such as the Fourth Circuit's in Norton v. United States3 ' that the
1974 amendments to the FTCA waived sovereign immunity with respect to
constitutional claims," were much less possible. Carlson's mandate that the
FTCA did not provide an adequate remedy for civil rights claims inhibited broad
interpretations of the impact of the 1974 Amendments. Those courts that had
interpreted the FTC.A expansively soon began to narrow the scope of the Act.'
The Court's analysis of the FrCA would become the major stumbling block for
future interpretation of the FTCA as a vehicle for the redress of constitutional
claims.
Both avenues of using the FTCA as a remedy for constitutional claims that were
explored by the lower courts were frustrated. The 1974 Amendments were not a
general waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to constitutional claims." The
Court had interpreted "the law of the place" to limit the scope of the FTCA to
claims based on state law.'39 The Court also emphasized the requirement of
uniformity in a remedy for constitutional claims."4 Therefore, using state law as
a mechanism for vindicating federal constitutional rights was not an adequate basis
for remedy. While not directly faced with the question of whether a constitutional
claim could be brought under the FTCA, the Court in Carlson effectively limited
that possibility.
The Court in Carlson was led to its narrow interpretation of the FT7CA by the
logic that Bivens allowed a claim based on the Constitution only when there was no
other adequate remedy. Thus, in order to preserve and expand Bivens, other
available remedies, such as the FrCA, had to be denigrated and characterized as
inadequate to protect the constitutional interest of the plaintiff, making the need for
a Bivens claim unarguably apparent.
C. Post-Carlson Decisions
Following Carlson, judicial interpretations of the FTCA reflected the Court's view
of the narrowness of the remedy, and expansive views of the FTCA as a remedy for
constitutional claims diminished. The limitations Carlson imposed on interpretation
of the FTCA were explored in Brown v. United States.""' In Brown, the plaintiff
brought a claim under the FTCA for malicious prosecution and for violations of
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The court, relying on the interpretation of
134. See id. at 21-22.
135. 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1978).
136. See id. at 392-93.
137. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 653 F.2d 196,201-02 (5th Cir. 1981); Van Schaick v. United
States, 586 F. Supp. 1023, 1031 (D.S.C. 1983).
138. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 28-29 (Powell, J., concurring).
139. See id. at 23.
140. Id.
141. 653 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1981).




the FTCA set forth in Carlson, held that the plaintiffs claims based on the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments were not cognizable under the FTCA. * The court in
Brown addressed the question of whether the plaintiffs constitutional claims were
cognizable under the FTCA by seeking to determine whether Congress had waived
sovereign immunity with respect to those claims in its 1974 amendments to the
FTCA.Y The Brown court determined that the broad language of the 1974
Amendments, which provided that the FTCA would be applicable to claims arising
out of a series of intentional torts including malicious prosecution, could be read as
a waiver of sovereign immunity that would extend to constitutional claims.1 4 In
reviewing the 1974 Amendments, the court also determined that "[t]he legislative
history suggests that, at least under some circumstances, Congress intended to
provide a new remedy for any violation of constitutional rights."'"
The court in Brown concluded, however, that given the interpretation of 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) by the Supreme Court in Carlson, a broad interpretation of the
waiver of sovereign immunity in the 1974 Amendments would be inappropriate.
Because "Carlson ... instructs us that the liability of the United States under the
Act arises only when the law of the state would impose it," the court concluded that
a claim based directly on the Constitution could not be brought under the FTCA.47
The court also opined that Norton's determination that the 1974 amendments to the
FTCA allowed Bivens actions against the United States was no longer "tenable"
post-Carlson."s
The court in Van Schaick v. United States'49 also focused on the question of
whether the 1974 Amendments were a waiver of sovereign immunity for
constitutional claims. The court, citing Carlson, stated that it doubted it had
jurisdiction over constitutional claims." ° According to Van Schaick, Carlson might
well preclude the use of the FTCA to bring constitutional claims because Carlson
interpreted "the FTCA to mean that 'the liability of the United States under the Act
arises only when the law of the state would impose it."
' 5'
As a result of the Court's limited view of the FTCA in Carlson, interpretation of
the 1974 Amendments as a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to
constitutional torts was effectively cut short. The legitimacy of the tentative and
hesitant expansion of the FTCA to incorporate federal constitutional claims was
thrown into question. The Court's opinion in Carlson was based on an interpretation
See id.
143. See id. at 201. The dismissal of the plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim was affirmed based
on the trial court's factual finding that plaintiff had not proved the elements of malicious prosecution
under Texas law. See id. at 199.
144. See id. at 200.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 201.
148. Id. at 201 n.4.
149. 586 F. Supp. 1023 (D.S.C. 1983).
150. See id. at 1029.
151. Id. at 1031 (quoting Brown, 653 F.2d at 201).
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of the FTCA as based solely on state law, an insistence that the law applied to
constitutional claims be consistent, and a conception of the FTCA as providing only
limited relief. These conclusions left individuals whose constitutional rights were
violated by the federal government with essentially only a Bivens claim. As the law
developed with respect to Bivens, even that remedy became increasingly insubstan-
tial.
II. The Consequences of the Rejection of the FTCA
A. The Inadequacy of Bivens
Justice Brennan',; conclusion that Bivens was a superior remedy to that provided
by the FTCA overlooked benefits a constitutional claim under the FTCA would
provide a plaintiff and failed to take into account some significant limitations in the
remedy provided by Bivens. Providing a remedy for violations of constitutional law
under the FTCA would result in many advantages to the aggrieved citizen, the
federal employees, and the federal agency involved in the claim. A remedy against
the United States also serves the general interest of society in limiting un-
constitutional behavior.
In comparing the contrasting benefits of Bivens claims and claims under the
FTCA, several issues emerge. The first question is the kind of deterrence provided
by each of the remedies; secondly, what does each of the remedies provide to the
plaintiff in a satisfactory resolution? In addition, different attendant individual and
governmental costs accompany each type of liability.
On the issue of deterrence, several commentators have concluded that individual
liability under Bivens is not effective at getting to the causes of unconstitutional
behavior. The superior deterrence value of governmental liability is emphasized by
Professor Peter H. Schuck in his influential work Suing Government." He argues
that the governmental entity generally has more control over the circumstances that
led to the constitutional violation than does an individual; therefore, focusing the
financial incentives on the government rather than on the individual increases the
likelihood that the agency involved will take steps to avoid liability.' Identifying
the.causes of misconduct as lack of comprehension, inability and lack of motivation
to perform properly, and negligence, Professor Schuck suggests that these defects
are better remedied at a system-wide level than through individual deterrence."
Interestingly, in Owen v. City of Independence,'55 Justice Brennan outlined the
benefits of governmental liability for civil rights violations, rather than emphasizing
the benefits of individual liability as he did in Carlson." Referring to the benefits
of municipal liability for civil right violations, Justice Brennan stated:
152. PETER H. SCI-UCK, SUING COVERNMENr. CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 182-98
(1983).
153. See id at 102-03.
154. See iL at 100.
155. 445 U.S. 622 (1980). In Owen, the Court determined that municipalities could not assert
qualified or goad faith immunity in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions. See id. at 650.




[Tihe threat that damages might be levied against the city may
encourage those in a policymaking position to institute internal rules and
programs designed to minimize the likelihood of unintentional infrin-
gements on constitutional rights. Such procedures are particularly
beneficial in preventing those "systematic" injuries that result not so
much from the conduct of any single individual, but from the interactive
behavior of several government officials, each of whom may be acting
in good faith."
Justice Brennan also referred to the possibility that the threat of individual liability
would result in "paralyzing the governing official's decisiveness and distorting his
judgment on matters of public policy."'5
On the issue of satisfactory compensation, commentators on Bivens jurisprudence
have also emphasized the relative lack of meaningful financial judgments that have
resulted from such claims.'" The reluctance of juries and judges to award
damages against individual employees prevents victims of constitutional wrongs
from receiving a meaningful remedy." ° Few claims survive to judgment, and the
monetary awards are generally quite low.' One reason courts and jurors may be
reluctant to subject an individual defendant to significant liability is the understan-
ding that the individual is merely a stand-in for the larger governmental entity, and
that to punish an individual for a systematic problem is unfair."
Even if a large award is granted against an individual defendant, there is still the
question of whether the defendant can satisfy such a judgment; clearly, there is no
such limitation on a judgment against the United States.63 Governmental liability,
such as that under the FTCA, would maximize the plaintiffs chances of obtaining
adequate compensation because of the vastly superior resources of the federal
government as compared to an individual employee. 6'
157. Id. at 652.
158. Id. at 655-56.
159. See SCHUCK, supra note 152, at 70 n.56; William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations
Concerning Tort Liability of Government and Its Employees for Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN.
L.J. AM. U. 1105, 1143 (1996). As of 1982, of 10,000 Bivens claims, only 13 resulted in judgments.
Kratzke, supra, at 1149-50.
160. See Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MIcH L. REV. 5, 41-56 (1980). Professor
Whitman extensively critiques the remedies provided by section 1983, which provides for individual
liability against state officials for violations of constitutional rights. See id. at 7. One of Professor
Whitman's suggestions is that equitable relief, rather than money damages would be a more effective way
to prevent the occurrence of constitutional violations. See id. at 70.
161. See SCHUCK, supra note 152, at 70.
162. See Whitman, supra note 160, at 258-59.
163. See Thomas J. Madden et al., Bedtime for Bivens: Substituting the United States as Defendant
in Constitutional Tort Suits, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 469, 473 (1983). Professors Madden, Alland, and
Remes analyze legislation then pending in Congress to explicitly amend the FTCA to substitute the
United States as a defendant for constitutional claims against individual federal employees. See id. at
476-97.
164. See SCHUCK, supra note 152, at 100-01.
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Another barrier between a victim of constitutional wrong and a satisfactory
resolution of his claim is the protection afforded individuals by qualified immunity.
The qualified immunity defense protects a federal employee when his actions were
not violations of clearly established law about which he reasonably should have
known.' The judicial creation of qualified immunity may be yet another
indication of the general reluctance to subject individual employees to liability for
constitutional wrongs." Bivens claims almost universally begin with the defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. Litigation
of the qualified immunity issue can consume a long period of time before the
ultimate issue of whether the plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated is ever
reached." Often, the litigation never goes beyond the issue of immunity. ,
The qualified inmunity defense also increases the amount of governmental
resources that are expended in defending Bivens claims." The defense of an
FTCA claim is less costly because the qualified immunity defense and the attendant
right to an interlocutory appeal is not available, and because the stakes are perceived
to be less high when an individual's personal liability is not at issue.6 Ironically,
the qualified immunity defense which so limits a plaintiffs ability to recover is also
of limited usefulness to a federal employee. The employee will still have to
participate in and perhaps pay for several years of litigation while the qualified
immunity issue is decided, even if the suit is ultimately dismissed70
Several commentators have suggested that the threat of individual liability, rather
than providing a deterrent to violations of civil rights, creates an atmosphere in
which federal employee performance and decision making are adversely af-
fected.' For example, Professor Schuck concludes that the possibility of
individual liability has a negative effect on the performance of governmental
officials by inhibiting vigorous decision making." Risk avoidance behavior on the
part of government officials leads to inaction, delay, formalism, and increased
165. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
166. See H. Allen Bfack, Balance, Band-Aid, or Tourniquet: The Illusion of Qualified Immunity for
Federal Officials, 32 Wm. & MARY L. Rn'v. 733, 735 (1991). Professor Black argues that the FTCA
should be amended to mike it an explicit remedy for constitutional torts. See id.
167. Based on Harlow, defendants have the right to an immediate appeal of the qualified immunity
issue, thus allowing the issue to considerably delay an adjudication of the merits of the constitutional
claim. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813-14.
168. The United States Attorney's Office provides representation for federal employees in Bivens
claims in most circumstances. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a) (1990).
169. See Black, supra note 166, at 776-78. Professor Black focused on a problem intrinsic in the
focus on qualified immvnity. See id. at 773. The issue before the court is whether the individual
employee reasonably should have known that his actions violated the constitution. See id. at 759. This
misplaces the emphasis of the litigation which would more properly be on the issue of whether the
plaintiffs rights were violated. See id, at 763-64. This misplaced emphasis also inhibits the development
of clear guidance on what constitutes unconstitutional behavior. See id. at 765,
170. See id. at 752-53.
171. See, e.g., ScHuCK, supra note 152, at 70-71; Madden et al., supra note 163, at 481-82.




bureaucratism and to choosing the less controversial alternative when an official is
faced with a decision. '73
Of course there are some benefits provided by Bivens claims that are not
presently available under the FTCA. A plaintiff does not have the option of a jury
trial or punitive damages under the FTCA.'" There are also procedural hurdles,
such as the requirement of filing an administrative claim,75 that are required under
the FTCA but not in a Bivens claim. However, it is not at all clear that Bivens is
a superior remedy to the FTCA. Indeed, in situations in which the sotrce of the
constitutional violation is based on an agency policy, Bivens might well provide no
remedy against an individual official if he acted in good faith, while a claim under
the FTCA could reach to the systemic source of the violation.'76
173. See id. at 59.
174. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980). At least one
commentator has suggested that the FrCA's failure to provide for ajury trial would constitute a violation
of the Seventh Amendment if the FTCA were the exclusive remedy for constitutional violations. See
Roger W. Kirst, Jury Trial and the Federal Tort Claims Act: Time to Recognize the Seventh Amendment
Right, 58 Tx. L. REV. 549, 550-51 (1980).
175. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), (b) (1994).
176. Since the 1974 amendments to the FrCA, there have been several attempts to again address
the issue of federal governmental liability for constitutional wrongs through further amendment of the
FTCA. See H.R. 700, 100th Cong. (1988); S. 829, 98th Cong. (1983); S. 775, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R.
595, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 7034, 97th Cong. (1982); H.R. 6359, 97th Cong. (1982); S. 1775, 97th
Cong. (1981); H.R. 1696, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 24, 97th Cong. (1981); S. 695, 96th Cong. (1979);
H.R. 2659, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 193, 96th Cong. (1979); S. 3314, 95th Cong. (1978); S. 2868, 95th
Cong. (1978); S. 2117, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 12,715, 93d Cong. (1977); H.R. 9219, 95th Cong.
(1977).
The most nearly successful attempt to address the dissatisfaction with the current scheme came in
1981, 1982 and 1983 when both the House and the Senate were considering proposed amendments to
the FTCA. See Title XIII of S. 829 - To Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.
136 (1983); Hearings on H. R. 595, Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 5 (1983); Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 24, H.R.
3060 & H.R. 3795 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 23 (1982); Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearings on
S. 1775 Before the Subcomm. on Agency Admin. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 1, 97th
Cong. (1981). Those proposed amendments would have made the United States the exclusive defendant
for constitutional torts committed by federal employees within the scope of their employment. See id.;
see also Madden et al., supra note 163, at 470. Government officials from the Justice Department,
including the Director of the FBI, testified in favor of the amendments. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims
Act: Hearings on S. 1775 Before the Subcomm. on Agency Admin. of the Comm on the Judiciary, Part
2, 97th Cong. 2-3 (1982) (testimony of FBI director William Webster); Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R.
24 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 22-23 (1982) (testimony of Deputy Attorney General Edward C. Schmults).
Professor Peter H. Schuck also testified, expressing his belief that governmental liability would further
the goals of compensation to the victims, encouragement of vigorous decision making by governmental
officials, and improved deterrence. See id. at 13-14 (testimony of Peter H. Schuck).
Amendment of the FTCA to more explicitly allow for the bringing of constitutional torts would be
an opportunity for Congress to not only allow plaintiffs to use the FTCA to redress civil rights claims,
but could also be an opportunity to address additional issues raised by the use of the FTCA in civil rights
litigation. Provisions for punitive damages, attorney's fees, and the right to a jury trial, might be included
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B. The Stalled Expansion of Bivens
In deciding that Bivens was a superior remedy to the FTCA, the Court in Carlson
apparently anticipated the continued expansion and strengthening of Bivens claims.
However, rather than continuing to expand the Bivens remedy, in decisions
following Carlson the Supreme Court has consistently declined to expand Bivens
claims to other civil rights violations by federal officials.'"
In Chappell v. Wallace,7 ' Bush v. Lucas,"' and Schweiker v. Chilicky,"'
respectively, the Court determined that Bivens would not be expanded to cover
claims based on race discrimination in the military,' claims based on the exercise
of First Amendment rights by a NASA employee," or due process claims made
by social security recipients." The reasoning in these cases was starkly in contrast
with the aggressive approach to the availability of Bivens claims set forth in
Carlson."8 Unlike in Carlson, the Court's decisions in Chappell, Bush, and
in an amendment to provide a plaintiff with a civil rights claim against the United States rights and
protections similar to those now afforded under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. See Madden et al., supra note 163,
at 471-72; Black, supra note 166, at 777-78; see also Kirst, supra note 174, at 549. However, there
seems little political will to pursue such a goal, and it seems unlikely that expansion of the scope of the
FTCA will soon be aocomplished through congressional action.
177. See infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text. Prior to Carlson, in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228 (1979), the Court allowed a Bivens claim for the violation of Fifth Amendment equal protection
rights by a congressional employee who alleged she had been discriminated against on the basis of her
gender. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 234.
178. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
179. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
180. 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
181. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304.
182. See Bush, 462 U.S at 390.
183. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 414; see also United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 (1987)
(holding that no Bivens claim available for solider injured in military service, even though no alternative
remedy); Neely v. Blumenthal, 458 F. Supp. 945, 947 (D.D.C 1978) (refusing application of Bivens to
a Title VII claim); Langster v. Schweiker, 565 F. Supp. 407, 419 (N.D. I11. 1983) (denying application
of Bivens to Social Security Administration civil rights claim); Gillam v. Roudebush, 547 F. Supp. 28,
33 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding that Bivens is inapplicable to First and Fourth Amendment Claims).
In Chappell, the Court determined that because the alleged constitutional violation arose in the context
of the military, the "special factors" referred to in Bivens, counselled hesitation in the creation of a
remedy. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 298. The Court also pointed to the established system for discipline
within the military as & mechanism already in place to deal with the problem. See id. at 302. In Bush,
the Court similarly determined that a Bivens claim was not appropriate when a NASA employee claimed
that he had been fired because of the exercise of Furst Amendment speech rights. See Bush, 462 U.S.
at 390. The Court concluded that it should hesitate to create a remedy because Congress had unique
expertise in dealing with federal personnel matters and Congress had created an elaborate system of civil
service remedies to deal with federal employee grievances. See id. at 381-89. Again in Schweiker, the
Court held that a due process claim based on the denial of social security benefits should not be the basis
of a Bivens claim becalise deference to the remedial scheme created by Congress was appropriate. See
Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 412. The Court reached this conclusion even though in the remedial scheme
created by Congress for the denial of social security benefits, there was no damages remedy for this
constitutional wrong. See id. at 440 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184. In Simpson v McCarthy, 741 F. Supp 95 (W.D. Pa. 1990), the court went so far to state that




Schweiker reflect little analysis of the adequacy of the alternative remedy provided
by Congress."u Clearly, the kind of scrutiny the FTCA was given in Carlson to
determine whether it provided an adequate remedy was no longer the standard.'
Since Carlson there had clearly been a shift in the will of the Court to expand civil
rights claims.'
The expansion of Bivens as a far-reaching remedy for constitutional claims has
not occurred. Concurrently, the potential breadth of the FTCA as a mechanism for
redress of constitutional claims has not been realized. Ironically, were Carlson
decided today, the fate of the FTCA might well be quite different. Applying the
standards developed in Chappell, Bush, and Schweiker, the FTCA could be
perceived as an adequate remedy for improper medical treatment at a correctional
facility, therefore obviating the need for a Bivens claim. Had that happened, the
pressure to read the FTCA broadly would have continued rather than being
constrained as dictated by Carlson. Having created a paradigm in Bivens that
precluded two complementary civil rights remedies, the Court chose the extension
of Bivens rather than the amplification of the FTCA. However, as the law stands
today, neither Bivens nor the FTCA provides a satisfactory mechanism for redress
of civil rights claims against the United States.
The limitations of the present interpretation of the two remedies is made clear,
for example, in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Meyer." In Meyer, the
Supreme Court held that a constitutional claim against the federal government was
not cognizable under the FTCA 89 Justice Thomas, writing the opinion for a
remedial scheme equivalent to Bivens and had expressly stated that the remedy was exclusive, is not
good law." Simpson, 741 F. Supp. at 97.
185. And, in the case of Schweiker, the fact that Congress had decided not to create a remedy at all
was not considered a basis for the Court to create a cause of action. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 415.
186. The reason for this shift in analysis cannot be explained solely by the different factual contexts
in which the cases arose. While special deference may be more appropriate in the context of the military,
there seems to be little principled reason why the federal prison system should be any less within the
expertise of Congress than federal employees, or the social security system. See Gene R. Nichol, Bivens,
Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA, L. REv. 1117, 1126-27 (1989); Joan Steinman,
Backing OffBivens and the Ramifications of this Retreat for the Vindication of First Amendment Rights,
83 MICH. L. REv. 269, 294-95 (1984).
187. Rather than writing the opinion of the Court, Justice Brennan became the dissenter in
Schweiker, and argued that the remedial mechanisms provided by Congress for those denied social
security benefits did not preclude recognition of a Bivens claim. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 431
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan pointed to the inadequacies of the remedial scheme provided
by Congress for denial of social security benefits: constitutional challenges cannot be raised during
administrative review and no consequential damages can be awarded. See id. at 436 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Further, Justice Brennan stated that Congress, in creating a remedial mechanism for those
denied social security benefits, did not mean to preclude a Bivens claim. See id. at 431 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan also concluded that unlike in Chappell (military discipline) and Bush (federal
employment), Congress had no special expertise in the area of the social welfare system which made it
appropriate for the courts to defer from creating remedies. See id. at 440-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
By 1988, however, these arguments no longer won the day, and instead, the expansion of Bivens was
further limited. See id. at 414.
188. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
189. See id. at 477-78.
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unanimous Court, based its conclusion that no constitutional claim could be brought
on the language requiring that liability under the FTCA be based on the "law of the
place" and on its determination that that requirement means "the law of the
State."1" Justice Thomas emphasized that "the United States has not rendered
itself liable under § 1346(b) for constitutional tort claims.''.
The Court declined to extend Bivens liability to federal agencies, determining that
a constitutional claim could not be implied against the FDIC." A Bivens claim
the plaintiff had previously brought against an FDIC employee had been dismissed
based on qualified immunity.' The Court cited Carlson, concluding that a Bivens
claim directly against an individual employee should not be circumvented by
allowing a similar claim directly against a federal agency: "[i]f we were to imply
a damages action directly against federal agencies, thereby permitting claimants to
bypass qualified immunity, there would be no reason for aggrieved parties to bring
damages actions against individual officers. Under [that] regime, the deterrent
effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost."" 4 Thus, foreclosed from a claim
based on the FTCA and prevented from an extension of Bivens liability, the plaintiff
in Meyers was left without a remedy.
Conclusion
Neither Bivens nor the FTCA has become a vigorous mechanism for the redress
of constitutional claims. The failure of the FrCA to be used as such a mechanism
can largely be laid at the door of the Carlson decision, which interpreted the FTCA
in such a narrow way that it precluded expansive use of the statute. Ironically, the
Carlson decision seems intended to make a strong case for the necessity of Bivens.
However, the expansive and aggressive approach to Bivens that the Carlson court
sought to promote has also failed to survive.
If the opportunity presented by the 1974 amendments to the FTCA had been
taken, the current landscape with respect to civil rights claims might be quite
different. Instead o1f only an unreliable remedy against individual federal employees,
victims of unconstitutional acts by the federal government might also be able to
seek redress directly against the most responsible party, the United States.
190. Id. Interestingly, none of the authority Justice Thomas cited for this proposition discuss the
impact that the 1974 amn.ndments to the FTCA had on 28 U.S.C. § 1346; indeed, most of the cases cites
to illustrate the meaning of the "law of the place" are pre-1974. See Ua
191. Id. at 478.
192. See id at 484-85.
193. See id at 485.
194. Id.
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